The Supply Chain’s New Security Checkpoint: Vetting Drones for National Security Risk

Laura V. Garcia
Sep 30, 2025
5 min read

Updated: Oct 2, 2025

Illustration showing a drone being stopped at a security checkpoint sign labeled "Supply Chain's New Checkpoint," visually representing the vetting process for national security risks.

Drone technology offers unparalleled logistics efficiency, but introduces critical cyber-geopolitical risks. Your next procurement decision is a strategic security imperative.

Drones as Supply Chain Gateways

In a globalized component market dominated by Chinese manufacturing, supply chain executives face frontline challenges in cyber-geopolitical risk management.

Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS), or drones, have evolved from niche tools into critical nodes in supply chain infrastructure—mapping warehouses, delivering time-sensitive cargo, and feeding real-time data into logistics networks. As operations expand Beyond Visual Line of Sight (BVLOS), drones serve not only as couriers but also as networked endpoints with strategic sensitivity comparable to servers or industrial control systems—vulnerabilities highlighted in the recent Critical Supply Chain Alert: VPN Attack Exposes Global Logistics to State-Sponsored Espionage.

For procurement and supply chain leaders, drones represent more than an efficiency investment—they constitute a national security decision. A compromised drone can expose facility blueprints, alter cargo routes, or grant adversaries access to enterprise IT systems.

Key Risks: More Than Cybersecurity

Espionage and Data Exfiltration

Under China’s 2017 National Intelligence Law, Chinese companies are obligated to assist state intelligence efforts, creating an unavoidable risk of covert data leaks through software updates or cloud storage. The U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued an industry alert in 2019 warning that Chinese-made drones may transmit sensitive corporate data to foreign governments.

Sabotage and Logistics Disruption

Manipulating a drone’s control system can cause crashes, cargo loss, or kinetic attacks on infrastructure. The Department of Homeland Security documented vulnerabilities in command-and-control systems and GPS spoofing that allow adversaries to hijack unmanned aircraft.

Cargo Theft and Diversion

Research at the University of Texas at Austin demonstrated GPS spoofing as early as 2012, showing drones could be diverted mid-flight without triggering alarms. For operators carrying high-value pharmaceuticals or restricted components, this risk extends beyond theft to liability for illicit use or diversion.

Real-World Validation: Policy and Incident Examples

U.S. Department of the Interior Drone Fleet Grounding (2020)

In January 2020, the Interior Department grounded its fleet of about 800 drones, mostly sourced from Chinese manufacturers, after a security review raised concerns about data transfers to foreign adversaries. These drones, used for wildfire management and land mapping, were deemed high-risk because they captured sensitive geographic and infrastructure data, according to the U.S. Department of the Interior.

Lesson: Even drones in “non-sensitive” applications can expose facility and infrastructure details that constitute national security vulnerabilities.

Public Safety Drone Hijack Demonstration (2019)

At a 2019 FAA counter-UAS demonstration, law enforcement tested drone vulnerabilities using radio frequency takeover scenarios. In one exercise, a drone carrying a simulated package was forced to divert and land outside its perimeter, as reported by the FAA.

Lesson: Both physical and data assets are at risk. Compromised drones can be diverted for theft or sabotage, leading to regulatory violations or supply chain paralysis.

Military Procurement as the Standard

Regulatory Baseline

The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2020, Sec. 848, prohibits U.S. federal agencies from purchasing drones or components from “covered foreign entities,” including manufacturers in China.

Blue vs. Green UAS Programs

Blue UAS systems, certified by the Defense Innovation Unit, represent the highest level of supply chain integrity for military operations (Defense Innovation Unit). The Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International launched Green UAS in 2023 to certify NDAA-compliant drones for commercial and non-defense use (AUVSI, 2023).

These programs serve as de facto security certifications in commercial supply chains.

Best Procurement Practices

To mitigate these threats, procurement leaders must pivot to a secure-by-design acquisition strategy. This requires adopting federal frameworks, such as NIST SP 800-161 Rev. 1 and CISA’s Supply Chain Risk Management guidance, by executing the following core practices:

Mandate Certification: Require Green UAS or Blue UAS compliance in all drone RFPs. This ensures suppliers undergo security vetting comparable to Department of Defense standards, aligning with NIST’s recommendation to procure ICT products only from vendors with verified, trustworthy supply chains.
Scrutinize Data Policy: Demand written assurance on where and how operational data—including flight telemetry, imagery, and sensor metadata—is stored. CISA warns that foreign jurisdiction over data storage heightens espionage risk and advises contractual obligations for in-country hosting and strict access controls.
Network Segmentation: Require documentation proving the drone’s ground control station and maintenance software can be segmented from IT and OT corporate networks. According to NIST, operational technology systems connected to external supply chains must be isolated to prevent cascading compromise.
Continuous Vetting: Enforce ongoing verification policies. All software and firmware updates should come directly from the manufacturer, with multi-factor authentication required for system access. Continuous monitoring—not one-time audits—is essential for resilient procurement.
Insurance Alignment: Collaborate with corporate risk officers and insurers to verify coverage extends to both cyber compromise and physical diversion of cargo. Industry reports highlight persistent insurance gaps: Many general liability policies exclude cyber-related UAS incidents, while drone operators face liability exposures from data breaches, physical losses, and regulatory violations if security standards are weak.

The Strategic Imperative

The global commercial drone market remains dominated by Chinese manufacturers—DJI alone has held over 70 percent market share in recent years, according to the Drone Analyst Market Share Report (2020). With U.S. commercial regulations still evolving, procurement leaders bear responsibility for securing drones against cyber and geopolitical risks.

By adopting military-grade procurement practices, organizations can achieve autonomous logistics efficiencies without sacrificing data security, cargo integrity, or infrastructure resilience. Supply chain security increasingly begins in the sky—what organizations purchase today will either safeguard or undermine tomorrow’s network.

Resource List

National People’s Congress. 2017. “China Enacts National Intelligence Law.” NPC Observer. Published June 28, 2017. https://npcobserver.com/2017/06/28/china-enacts-national-intelligence-law/
Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA). 2019. “Alert (AA19-243A): Chinese-made Drones May Transmit Corporate Data to Foreign Governments.” Accessed 2019. https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa19-243a
Department of Homeland Security, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (DHS CISA). 2020. “Unmanned Aircraft Systems: Considerations for Law Enforcement.” https://www.cisa.gov/publication/unmanned-aircraft-systems-considerations-law-enforcemen
Humphreys, Todd E., et al. 2012. “Unmanned Aircraft Capture and Control via GPS Spoofing.” University of Texas at Austin. https://rnl.ae.utexas.edu/images/stories/files/papers/unmannedCapture.pdf
U.S. Department of the Interior. 2020. “Department of the Interior Restricts Use of Some Unmanned Aircraft Systems Following Security Review.” Press Release, January 2020. https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/department-interior-restricts-use-some-unmanned-aircraft-systems-following-security-review
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). 2019. “Counter-UAS Demonstration Series.” https://www.faa.gov/uas/research_development/uas_test_sites/counter_uas/
U.S. Congress. 2020. “National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020, Section 848.” https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/2500/text
Defense Innovation Unit. “Blue UAS Programs.” Accessed 2025. https://www.diu.mil/blue-uas
Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI). 2023. “Green UAS Program.” https://www.auvsi.org/green-uas
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 2022. “Supply Chain Risk Management Practices for Federal Information Systems and Organizations, SP 800-161 Rev. 1.” https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-161/rev-1/final
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). “Supply Chain Risk Management Guidance.” https://www.cisa.gov/publication/supply-chain-risk-management-guidance
Marsh. “Drone Insurance and Risk Gaps.” Accessed 2025. https://www.marsh.com/us/insights/research/drone-insurance-and-risk-gaps.html
Lloyd’s Market Association. “Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) Advisory.” https://www.lloyds.com/market-resources/risk-insight/risk-reports/unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas
Drone Analyst. 2020. “Drone Analyst Market Share Report.” https://droneanalyst.com/market-report

Author Profile & Related Content

Laura V. Garcia is a leading B2B content strategist specializing in supply chain risk management, procurement best practices, and the integration of emerging technologies. Her analysis focuses on bridging the gap between strategic defense policy and commercial logistics operations.